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WEST YIIGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
to be attached to the testimony of each" was held to be proper.,
"The remark as to which of the witnesses was entitled to the
most credit, preceded and followed as it was by the explicit declara-
tion that the jury were the sole judges alike of the correctness
and credibility of the witnesses, calls for no interference."" "It
is error to charge the jury that they are bound to believe a wit-
ness unless he is impeached." 2 °
Now, we have in the United States two distinct lines *of decisions,
one upholding an instruction that tells a jury that it may arbi-
trarily disbelieve testimony, the other holding such instruction to,
be erroneous. Decisions of either kind have been handed down
in West Virginia at different times. The question then arises as
to which decision is the sounder. From the cardinal principle of
the common law that the jury are the sole judges of the evidence
it would seem to follow that it is entirely within their province to
accept or refuse withih their own minds such testimony as they
see fit. Otherwise they are not the sole judges of the evidence. If
this be true, then the West Virginia Court should not reverse a
case because the jury has been instructed that they are the sole
judges of the evidence and that they may believe or refuse to be-
lieve any witness, as it has done in the recent decisions cited.
-R. G. K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LicENsE.-The petitioner averred that
section 35a of Chapter 32 Code 1913 as amended and re-enacted
by sections 35a and 35b of Chapter 109, Acts 1921, insofar as they
undertake to give the discretion to grant or refuse licenses
are in contravention of the equal protection of the law clause
of the United States Constition. The section, the constitu-
tionality of which is in question, provides that the coun-
ty court may at its discretion grant or refuse the application
of any person for a license to keep a pool table for public resort.
Held, that the statute does not infringe the equal protection of
the law clause of the Federal Constitution. State, ex rel. Hamrick
v. Pocahontas County Court, et al., 114 S. E. 519, (W. Va. 1922).
Section 35b of Chapter 109, Acts 1921 transfers all powers,
including the discretionary power of section 35a, to the council of
18 22 2nd Dec. Dig. 337.
29 Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa. St. 424, 62 Am. Dec. 841 (1854); 14 R. C. L. 733.
2 State v. Smallwood, 75 N. C. 104 (1876).
1
H.: Constitutional Law--Licenses
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1923
STUDENT NOTES AND REGENT CASES
municipal corporations. The conducting of billiard and pool rooms
for hire or public use is a constant menace to the public peace
and morals and they may be subjected to control and regulation
or, indeed, entirely prohibited. City of Tarkio v. Cooke, 120 Mo.
1, 25 S. W. 202; Clearwater v. Bowman, 72 Kans. 92, 82 Pac. 526;
Tanner v. Albion, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 121; Hall v. State, 98 Ky. 648,
343 S. W. 22; Corinth v. Crittenden, 94 Miss. 41, 47 So. 525; Booth
v. Illinois 184 U. S. 425. This attitude of the courts toward such
public resorts is not only generally adopted in the United States
at the present time but it was very early maintained in England
as evidenced by the fact that Lord Hale in 1672 upheld a munici-
pal by-law forbidding the keeping of such resorts due to the
demoralizing tendencies which accompanied them. Rex v. Hall, 2
Keb. 846. While the existence of a pool room is not a nuisance
per se, it may become such and the municipal authorities are not
bound to wait until the evil becomes flagrant before exercising
their power of regulation. Such regulation, when exercised, is
aimed not at the business, as such, but at the evils accompanying.
the business. Under the police power, the maintenance of such a
resort may be entirely prohibited. Murphey v. California, 225 U
S. 623. Where the only legislative authority conferred upon thez
municipality with reference to pool rooms is to license such pIace
by ordinance, the power to license is to be construed as a power to
regulate through the license ordinance and the city council may
thereby impose such reasonable terms and conditions as may be
necessary to make the license issued in pursuance thereof effica-
cious.as a police power. State v. Pamperin, 42 Minn. 320, 44 N. W.
251. The proposition that the confering of discretionary power
upon municipal councils to grant or withhold permission to carry
on a business which is the proper subject of regulation within the
police power of the state is not violative of rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, is undoubtedly correct. New York State
v. Vann de Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 50 L. Ed. 305. However the oppo-
site of this doctrine is supported by a number of respectable
authorities including West Virginia. Lynch et. al. v. Town of
Northview et. al., 73, W. Va. 609, 81 S. E. 833; Houvouras v. City
of Huntington, 90 W. Va. 245, 110 S. E. 692; Commonwealth v.
Matetsky, 203 Mass. 241, 89 N. E. 245. But to prevent this broad
a.IA important power from being abused by a discriminating or
predjudicial application, it is held a duty of the licensing author-
ities to determine from an honest judgment based upon personal'
investigation whether an applicant is a proper person to be licensed.
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Darby v- Pierce, 17 Idaho 697, 107 Pac. 484; Perry v. Salt Lake
City, 7 Utah 143, 25 Pac. 739. An ordinance may be valid on its
face, but which if improperly applied, may become unconstitu-
tionaL Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. Where a municipal
-corporation has authority to regulate pool rooms under the police
power, the plaintiff can not be heard to complain of the loss of
bis property because he will be considered as having knowingly
engaged in an occupation without the protection of the Federal
Constitution and which lawfully could be regulated out of exist-
lence. Murpltey v. California, supra. Social interests demand and
authority sanctions the decision in the principal case.
-H. C. H.
UONTRAO1s, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-WRIT-
n]N NcESSARY TO TAKE CASE OUT OF OPERATION OF STATUTE.-
A agrees in writing to accept certain real estate in compromise of
a suit at law. B orally agrees to convey. Subsequently thereto A
attempts to withdraw and announces intention of continuing his
action at law. B tenders deed and brings his bill asking for
specific performance and that A's suit be enjoined. Held, in-
junction and specific performance granted. Ruckman v. Hay,
114 S. E. 514 (W. Va. 1922).
A could not have sued B upon his oral promise to convey,
because such suit is expressly excluded by the terms of the STAT-
rYI op FRAuDs, which in effect provides that no action shall be
brought upon any contract for the sale of land unless some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the party to
be charged. See W. VA. CODE, c. 98. The principal case is in
accord with the weight of authority, which treats this as a voidable
vontract allowing the party not signing to enforce the contract
against the party signing, thereby extending the privileges and
immunities of a class legally incompetent to a party who is legally
competent enabling such party to reap the advantages of a prof-
itable bargain and escape the consequences of an unfavorable one.
-Penniman v. Hartsiorn, 13 Mass. 91; McCrea v. Purmont, 16
Wend. 460; Mountain Park Land Co. v. Snidow 77 W. Va. 54, 86
S. RL 915. The courts so holding apparently treat this as a void-
able contract because the statute does not in terms preclude recov-
ery by the party not signing against party who has signed. Don-
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